A governance and institutional reform expert, Ini Abimbola, DBA, has reignited debate on corporate governance practices in Nigeria, arguing that many of the country’s enterprises operate under “dual governance systems” that obscure real decision-making structures.

In a recent commentary on succession challenges in African corporations, Abimbola noted that discussions around governance often extend beyond formal boardrooms into public discourse, reflecting growing concern about how businesses are actually controlled and managed.

She argued that a key misconception in African corporate classification is the distinction between “founder-led” and “family-owned” businesses, stating that many so-called founder-led firms are, in reality, family enterprises at different stages of maturity.

According to her, Nigeria’s corporate governance frameworks—including those issued by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the Pension Commission (PenCom), and the Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRCN)—were largely “transplanted rather than translated,” designed on assumptions similar to developed markets where ownership and management are clearly separated.

She observed that this structure often does not reflect the operational realities of many Nigerian firms, where formal governance structures exist on paper, but key decisions are frequently influenced or made within informal family networks.

“The board minutes say one thing, the family WhatsApp group decides another,” she noted, describing what he termed a disconnect between regulatory compliance and actual control mechanisms in some businesses.

Abimbola further stated that while there is nothing inherently problematic about family-owned enterprises, challenges arise when governance structures are presented as independent while decision-making remains concentrated within family units. He warned that this disconnect can weaken accountability, complicate succession planning, and embed conflicts of interest within corporate operations.

She proposed that businesses adopt more transparent structures by formally acknowledging their family-business identity and building governance systems that reflect that reality. These could include family councils, codified family constitutions, and empowered independent directors with clearer authority in decision-making processes.

To assess governance readiness, he suggested diagnostic questions for boards, including succession preparedness, leadership continuity, and the distribution of critical institutional knowledge.

Abimbola concluded that meaningful reform in Nigerian corporate governance may depend less on stricter compliance with imported frameworks and more on “structural honesty” in how companies define and manage their governance systems.

She added that the discussion forms part of his forthcoming book, The Operator’s Trap: Why Africa’s Best Executives Never Truly Lead, which explores leadership and succession challenges across African organizations.